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Subject: 90-757 & 90-1032 -- OPINION, CHISOM v. ROEMER




NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in
the preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested
to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to
press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


Nos. 90-757 and 90-1032


RONALD CHISOM, et al., PETITIONERS
v.
90-757
CHARLES E. ROEMER, GOVERNOR OF
LOUISIANA, et al.


UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v.
90-1032
CHARLES E. ROEMER, GOVERNOR OF
LOUISIANA, et al.


on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth
circuit

[June 20, 1991]



    Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
    The preamble to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 establishes that the
central purpose of the Act is "[t]o enforce the fifteenth amendment to the
Constitution of the United States."  {1}  The Fifteenth Amendment
provides:


    "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude."  U. S. Const., Amdt. 15, MDRV 1.


In 1982, Congress amended MDRV 2 of the Voting Rights Act  {2} to make
clear that certain practices and procedures that result in the denial or
abridgement of the right to vote are forbidden even though the absence of
proof of discriminatory intent protects them from constitutional challenge.
The question presented by this case is whether this "results test" protects
the right to vote in state judicial elections.  We hold that the coverage
provided by the 1982 amendment is coextensive with the coverage provided by
the Act prior to 1982 and that judicial elections are embraced within that
coverage.

I
    Petitioners in No. 90-757 represent a class of approximately 135,000
black registered voters in Orleans Parish, Louisiana.  App. 6-7, 13.  They
brought this action against the Governor and other state officials
(respondents) to challenge the method of electing justices of the Louisiana
Supreme Court from the New Orleans area.  The United States, petitioner in
No. 90-1032, intervened to support the claims advanced by the plaintiff
class.
    The Louisiana Supreme Court consists of seven justices, {3} five of
whom are elected from five single-member Supreme Court Districts, and two
of whom are elected from one multi member Supreme Court District. {4}  Each
of the seven members of the court must be a resident of the district from
which he or she is elected and must have resided there for at least two
years prior to election.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 7a.  Each of the justices
on the Louisiana Supreme Court serves a term of 10 years. {5}  The one
multimember district, the First Supreme Court District, consists of the
parishes of Orleans, St. Bernard, Plaquemines, and Jefferson. {6}  Orleans
Parish contains about half of the population of the First Supreme Court
District and about half of the registered voters in that district.  Chisom
v. Edwards, 839 F. 2d 1056, 1057 (CA5 1988).  More than one-half of the
registered voters of Orleans Parish are black, whereas more than
three-fourths of the registered voters in the other three parishes are
white.  App. 8.
    Petitioners allege that "the present method of electing two Justices to
the Louisiana Supreme Court at-large from the New Orleans area
impermissibly dilutes minority voting strength" in violation of MDRV 2 of
the Voting Rights Act.  Id., at 9.  Furthermore, petitioners claimed in the
courts below that the current electoral system within the First Supreme
Court District violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the
Federal Constitution because the purpose and effect of this election
practice "is to dilute, minimize, and cancel the voting strength" of black
voters in Orleans Parish.  Ibid.  Petitioners seek a remedy that would
divide the First District into two districts, one for Orleans Parish and
the second for the other three parishes.  If this remedy were adopted, the
seven members of the Louisiana Supreme Court would each represent a
separate single-member judicial district, and each of the two new districts
would have approximately the same population.  Id., at 8.  According to
petitioners, the new Orleans Parish district would also have a majority
black population and majority black voter registration.  Id., at 8, 47.
    The District Court granted respondents' motion to dismiss the
complaint.  Chisom v. Edwards, 659 F. Supp. 183 (ED La. 1987).  It held
that the constitutional claims were insufficient because the complaint did
not adequately allege a specific intent to discriminate.  Id., at 189.
With respect to the statutory claim, the court held that MDRV 2 is not
violated unless there is an abridgement of minority voters' opportunity "to
elect representatives of their choice."  Id., at 186-187.  The court
concluded that because judges are not "representatives," judicial elections
are not covered by MDRV 2.  Id., at 187.    The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed.  Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F. 2d 1056, cert. denied
sub nom. Roemer v. Chisom, 488 U. S. 955 (1988).  Before beginning its
analysis, the court remarked that "[i]t is particularly significant that no
black person has ever been elected to the Louisiana Supreme Court, either
from the First Supreme Court District or from any one of the other five
judicial districts."  839 F. 2d, at 1058.  After agreeing with the recently
announced opinion in Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F. 2d 275 (CA6 1988), it noted
that the broad definition of the terms "voting" and "vote" in MDRV 14(c)(1)
of the original Act expressly included judicial elections within the
coverage of MDRV 2. {7}  It also recognized Congress' explicit intent to
expand the coverage of MDRV 2 by enacting the 1982 amendment.  839 F. 2d,
at 1061. {8}  Consistent with Congress' efforts to broaden coverage under
the Act, the court rejected the State's contention that the term
"representatives" in the 1982 amendment was used as a word of limitation.
Id., at 1063 (describing State's position as "untenable").  Instead, the
court concluded that representative " `denotes anyone selected or chosen by
popular election from among a field of candidates to fill an office,
including judges.' "  Ibid. (quoting Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183,
1200 (SD Miss. 1987)).  The court buttressed its interpretation by noting
that "section 5 and section 2, virtually companion sections, operate in
tandem to prohibit discriminatory practices in voting, whether those
practices originate in the past, present, or future."  839 F. 2d, at 1064.
It also gleaned support for its construction of MDRV 2 from the fact that
the Attorney General had "consistently supported an expansive, not
restrictive, construction of the Act."  Ibid.  Finally, the court held that
the constitutional allegations were sufficient to warrant a trial, and
reinstated all claims.  Id., at 1065. {9}
    After the case was remanded to the District Court, the United States
filed a complaint in intervention in which it alleged that the use of a
multimember district to elect two members of the Louisiana Supreme Court is
a "standard, practice or procedure" that "results in a denial or abridgment
of the right to vote on account of race or color in violation of Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act."  App. 48.  After a nonjury trial, however, the
District Court concluded that the evidence did not establish a violation of
MDRV 2 under the standards set forth in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30
(1986).  App. to Pet. for Cert. 62a.  The District Court also dismissed the
constitutional claims.  Id., at 63a-64a.  Petitioners and the United States
appealed.  While their appeal was pending, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en
banc in another case, held that judicial elections were not covered under
MDRV 2 of the Act as amended.  League of United Latin American Citizens
Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 914 F. 2d 620 (1990) (hereinafter LULAC).
    The majority in LULAC concluded that Congress' use of the word
"representatives" in the phrase "to elect representatives of their choice"
in MDRV 2(b) of the Act indicated that Congress did not intend to authorize
vote dilution claims in judicial elections.  The en banc panel reached this
conclusion after considering (1) the "precise language" of the Amendment,
id., at 624; (2) the character of the judicial office, with special
emphasis on "the cardinal reason that judges need not be elected at all,"
id., at 622; and (3) the fact that the oneperson, one-vote rule had been
held inapplicable to judicial elections before 1982, id., at 626.
    The precise language of MDRV 2 on which the LULAC majority focused
provides that a violation of MDRV 2 is established if the members of a
protected class:


" `have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice.' "  Id., at 625 (quoting 42 U. S. C. MDRV 1973(b)).


Noting that this language protects both the "the broad and general
opportunity to participate in the political process and the specific one to
elect representatives," LULAC, 914 F. 2d, at 625, the court drew a
distinction between claims involving tests or other devices that interfere
with individual participation in an election, on the one hand, and claims
of vote dilution that challenge impairment of a group's opportunity to
elect representatives of their choice, on the other hand.  The majority
assumed that the amended MDRV 2 would continue to apply to judicial
elections with respect to claims in the first category, see ibid., but that
the word "representatives" excludes judicial elections from claims in the
second category.  See id., at 625-628.
    In the majority's view, it was "factually false" to characterize judges
as representatives because public opinion is "irrelevant to the judge's
role," id., at 622; "the judiciary serves no representative function
whatever: the judge represents no one."  Id., at 625.  The majority
concluded that judicial offices "are not `representative' ones, and their
occupants are not representatives."  Id., at 631.  Thus, Congress would not
have used the word "representatives," as it did in MDRV 2(b) of the Act, if
it intended that subsection to apply to vote dilution claims in judicial
elections.
    The majority also assumed that Congress was familiar with Wells v.
Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453 (MD La. 1972), summarily aff'd, 409 U. S. 1095
(1973), a reapportionment case in which the District Court held that "the
concept of one-man, one-vote apportionment does not apply to the judicial
branch of the government."  Wells, 347 F. Supp., at 454.  The express
reference in the Senate Report to the fact that the " `principle that the
right to vote is denied or abridged by dilution of voting strength derives
from the one-person, onevote reapportionment case of Reynolds v. Sims, [377
U. S. 533 (1964)],' " LULAC, 914 F. 2d, at 629 (quoting S. Rep. No. 97-417,
p. 19 (1982)), persuaded the majority that, in light of the case law
holding that judges were not representatives in the context of one-person,
one-vote reapportionment cases, see LULAC, 914 F. 2d., at 626 (citing
cases), Congress would not have authorized vote dilution claims in judicial
elections without making an express, unambiguous statement to that effect.
    Following the en banc decision in LULAC, the Court of Appeals remanded
this case to the District Court with directions to dismiss the complaint.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 1a-3a (per curiam).  It expressed no opinion on the
strength of petitioners' evidentiary case.  We granted certiorari, 498 U.
S. --- (1991), and set the case for argument with LULAC, see post, at ---.

II
    Our decision today is limited in character, and thus, it is useful to
begin by identifying certain matters that are not in dispute.  No
constitutional claims are before us. {10}  Unlike Wells v. Edwards, {11}
White v. Regester, {12} and Mobile v. Bol den, {13} this case presents us
solely with a question of statutory construction.  That question involves
only the scope of the coverage of MDRV 2 of the Voting Rights Act as
amended in 1982.  We therefore do not address any question concerning the
elements that must be proved to establish a violation of the Act or the
remedy that might be appropriate to redress a violation if proved.
    It is also undisputed that MDRV 2 applied to judicial elections prior
to the 1982 amendment, {14} and that MDRV 5 of the amended statute
continues to apply to judicial elections, see Clark v. Roemer, 500 U. S.
--- (1991).  Moreover, there is no question that the terms "standard,
practice, or procedure" are broad enough to encompass the use of
multimember districts to minimize a racial minority's ability to influence
the outcome of an election covered by MDRV 2. {15}  The only matter in
dispute is whether the test for determining the legality of such a
practice, which was added to the statute in 1982, applies in judicial
elections as well as in other elections.

III
    The text of MDRV 2 of the Voting Rights Act as originally enacted read
as follows:


    "Sec. 2. No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State
or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color."  79 Stat. 437.


The terms "vote" and "voting" were defined elsewhere in the Act to include
"all action necessary to make a vote effective in any primary, special, or
general election."  MDRV 14(c)(1) of the Act, 79 Stat. 445 (emphasis
added).  The statute further defined vote and voting as "votes cast with
respect to candidates for public or party office and propositions for which
votes are received in an election."  Ibid.
    At the time of the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, MDRV 2,
unlike other provisions of the Act, did not provoke significant debate in
Congress because it was viewed largely as a restatement of the Fifteenth
Amendment.  See H. R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 23 (1965) (MDRV
2 "grants . . . a right to be free from enactment or enforcement of voting
qualifications . . . or practices which deny or abridge the right to vote
on account of race or color"); see also S. Rep. No. 162, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 3, pp. 19-20 (1965).  This Court took a similar view of MDRV 2
in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 60-61 (1980).  There, we recognized that
the coverage provided by MDRV 2 was unquestionably coextensive with the
coverage provided by the Fifteenth Amendment; the provision simply
elaborated upon the Fifteenth Amendment.  Ibid.  Section 2 protected the
right to vote, and it did so without making any distinctions or imposing
any limitations as to which elections would fall within its purview.  As
Attorney General Katzenbach made clear during his testimony before the
House, "[e]very election in which registered electors are permitted to vote
would be covered" under MDRV 2. {16}
    The 1965 Act made it unlawful "to deny or abridge" the right to vote
"on account of race or color."  79 Stat. 437.  Congress amended MDRV 2 in
1975  {17} by expanding the original prohibition against discrimination "on
account of race or color" to include non-English speaking groups.  It did
this by replacing "race or color" with "race or color, or in contravention
of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2)" of the Act.  89 Stat. 402.
{18}  The 1982 amendment further expanded the protection afforded by MDRV
2.
    Justice Stewart's opinion for the plurality in Mobile v. Bolden, supra,
which held that there was no violation of either the Fifteenth Amendment or
MDRV 2 of the Voting Rights Act absent proof of intentional discrimination,
served as the impetus for the 1982 amendment.  One year after the decision
in Mobile, Chairman Rodino of the House Judiciary Committee introduced a
bill to extend the Voting Rights Act and its bilingual requirements, and to
amend MDRV 2 by striking out "to deny or abridge" and substituting "in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgment of."  {19}  The "results"
test proposed by Chairman Rodino was incorporated into S. 1992, {20} and
ultimately into the 1982 amendment to MDRV 2, and is now the focal point of
this litigation.
    Under the amended statute, proof of intent is no longer required to
prove a MDRV 2 violation.  Now plaintiffs can prevail under MDRV 2 by
demonstrating that a challenged election practice has resulted in the
denial or abridgement of the right to vote based on color or race.
Congress not only incorporated the results test in the paragraph that
formerly constituted the entire MDRV 2, but also designated that paragraph
as subsection (a) and added a new subsection (b) to make clear that an
application of the results test requires an inquiry into "the totality of
the circumstances."  {21}  The full text of MDRV 2 as amended in 1982 reads
as follows:


    "Sec. 2. (a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State
or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth
in section 4(f)(2), as provided in subsection (b).
    "(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading
to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not
equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected
by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice.  The extent to which members of a
protected class have been elected to office in the State or political
subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That
nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected
class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population."  96
Stat. 134.


    The two purposes of the amendment are apparent from its text.
Subsection 2(a) adopts a results test, thus providing that proof of
discriminatory intent is no longer necessary to establish any violation of
the section.  Subsection 2(b) provides guidance about how the results test
is to be applied.
    Respondents contend, and the LULAC majority agreed, that Congress'
choice of the word "representatives" in the phrase "have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice"  {22} in subsection
2(b) is evidence of congressional intent to exclude vote dilution claims
involving judicial elections from the coverage of MDRV 2.  We reject that
construction because we are convinced that if Congress had such an intent,
Congress would have made it explicit in the statute, or at least some of
the Members would have identified or mentioned it at some point in the
unusually extensive legislative history of the 1982 amendment. {23}  Our
conclusion is confirmed when we review the justifications offered by the
LULAC majority and respondents in support of their construction of the
statute; we address each of their main contentions in turn.

IV
    The LULAC majority assumed that MDRV 2 provides two distinct types of
protection for minority voters -- it protects their opportunity "to
participate in the political process" and their opportunity "to elect
representatives of their choice."  See LULAC, 914 F. 2d, at 625.  Although
the majority interpreted "representatives" as a word of limitation, it
assumed that the word eliminated judicial elections only from the latter
protection, without affecting the former.  Id., at 625, 629.  In other
words, a standard, practice, or procedure in a judicial election, such as a
limit on the times that polls are open, which has a disparate impact on
black voters' opportunity to cast their ballots under MDRV 2, may be
challenged even if a different practice that merely affects their
opportunity to elect representatives of their choice to a judicial office
may not.  This reading of MDRV 2, however, is foreclosed by the statutory
text and by our prior cases.
    Any abridgement of the opportunity of members of a protected class to
participate in the political process inevitably impairs their ability to
influence the outcome of an election.  As the statute is written, however,
the inability to elect representatives of their choice is not sufficient to
establish a violation unless, under the totality of the circumstances, it
can also be said that the members of the protected class have less
opportunity to participate in the political process.  The statute does not
create two separate and distinct rights.  Subsection (a) covers every
application of a qualification, standard, practice, or procedure that
results in a denial or abridgement of "the right" to vote.  The singular
form is also used in subsection (b) when referring to an injury to members
of the protected class who have less "opportunity" than others "to
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice."  42 U. S. C. MDRV 1973 (emphasis added).  It would distort the
plain meaning of the sentence to substitute the word "or" for the word
"and."  Such radical surgery would be required to separate the opportunity
to participate from the opportunity to elect. {24}
    The statutory language is patterned after the language used by Justice
White in his opinions for the Court in White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755
(1973) and Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971).  See n. 22, supra.  In
both opinions, the Court identified the opportunity to participate and the
opportunity to elect as inextricably linked.  In White v. Regester, the
Court described the connection as follows: "The plaintiffs' burden is to
produce evidence . . . that its members had less opportunity than did other
residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to
elect legislators of their choice."  412 U. S., at 766 (emphasis added).
And earlier, in Whitcomb v. Chavis, the Court described the plaintiffs'
burden as entailing a showing that they "had less opportunity than did
other . . . residents to participate in the political processes and to
elect legislators of their choice."  403 U. S., at 149 (emphasis added).
{25}
    The results test mandated by the 1982 amendment is applicable to all
claims arising under MDRV 2.  If the word "representatives" did place a
limit on the coverage of the Act for judicial elections, it would exclude
all claims involving such elections from the protection of MDRV 2.  For all
such claims must allege an abridgement of the opportunity to participate in
the political process and to elect representatives of one's choice.  Even
if the wisdom of Solomon would support the LULAC majority's proposal to
preserve claims based on an interference with the right to vote in judicial
elections while eschewing claims based on the opportunity to elect judges,
we have no authority to divide a unitary claim created by Congress.

V
    Both respondents and the LULAC majority place their principal reliance
on Congress' use of the word "representatives" instead of "legislators" in
the phrase "to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice."  42 U. S. C. MDRV 1973.  When Congress
borrowed the phrase from White v. Regester, it replaced "legislators" with
"representatives."  {26}  This substitution indicates, at the very least,
that Congress intended the amendment to cover more than legislative
elections.  Respondents argue, and the majority agreed, that the term
"representatives" was used to extend MDRV 2 coverage to executive
officials, but not to judges.  We think, however, that the better reading
of the word "representatives" describes the winners of representative,
popular elections.  If executive officers, such as prosecutors, sheriffs,
state attorneys general, and state treasurers, can be considered
"representatives" simply because they are chosen by popular election, then
the same reasoning should apply to elected judges. {27}
    Respondents suggest that if Congress had intended to have the statute's
prohibition against vote dilution apply to the election of judges, it would
have used the word "candidates" instead of "representatives."  Brief for
Respondents 20, and n. 9.  But that confuses the ordinary meaning of the
words.  The word "representative" refers to someone who has prevailed in a
popular election, whereas the word "candidate" refers to someone who is
seeking an office.  Thus, a candidate is nominated, not elected.  When
Congress used "candidate" in other parts of the statute, it did so
precisely because it was referring to people who were aspirants for an
office.  See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. MDRV 1971(b) ("any candidate for the
office of President"), MDRV 1971(e) ("candidates for public office"), MDRV
1973i(c) ("any candidate for the office of President"), MDRV 1973i(e)(2)
("any candidate for the office of President"), MDRV 1973l(c) ("candidates
for public or party office"), MDRV 1973ff-2 ("In the case of the offices of
President and Vice President, a vote for a named candidate"), MDRV 1974
("candidates for the office of President"), MDRV 1974e ("candidates for the
office of President").
    The LULAC majority was, of course, entirely correct in observing that
"judges need not be elected at all," 914 F. 2d, at 622, and that ideally
public opinion should be irrelevant to the judge's role because the judge
is often called upon to disregard, or even to defy, popular sentiment.  The
Framers of the Constitution had a similar understanding of the judicial
role, and as a consequence, they established that Article III judges would
be appointed, rather than elected, and would be sheltered from public
opinion by receiving life tenure and salary protection.  Indeed, these
views were generally shared by the States during the early years of the
Republic. {28}  Louisiana, however, has chosen a different course.  It has
decided to elect its judges and to compel judicial candidates to vie for
popular support just as other political candidates do.    The fundamental
tension between the ideal character of the judicial office and the real
world of electoral politics cannot be resolved by crediting judges with
total indifference to the popular will while simultaneously requiring them
to run for elected office. {29}  When each of several members of a court
must be a resident of a separate district, and must be elected by the
voters of that district, it seems both reasonable and realistic to
characterize the winners as representatives of that district.  Indeed, at
one time the Louisiana Bar Association characterized the members of the
Louisiana Supreme Court as representatives for that reason: "Each justice
and judge now in office shall be considered as a representative of the
judicial district within which is situated the parish of his residence at
the time of his election."  {30}  Louisiana could, of course, exclude its
judiciary from the coverage of the Voting Rights Act by changing to a
system in which judges are appointed, and in that way, it could enable its
judges to be indifferent to popular opinion.  The reasons why Louisiana has
chosen otherwise are precisely the reasons why it is appropriate for MDRV
2, as well as MDRV 5, of the Voting Rights Act to continue to apply to its
judicial elections.
    The close connection between MDRV 2 and MDRV 5 further undermines
respondents' view that judicial elections should not be covered under MDRV
2.  Section 5 requires certain States to submit changes in their voting
procedures to the District Court of the District of Columbia or to the
Attorney General for preclearance.  Section 5 uses language similar to that
of MDRV 2 in defining prohibited practices: "any voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to
voting."  42 U. S. C. MDRV 1973c.  This Court has already held that MDRV 5
applies to judicial elections.  Clark v. Roemer, 500 U. S. --- (1991).  If
MDRV 2 did not apply to judicial elections, a State covered by MDRV 5 would
be precluded from implementing a new voting procedure having discriminatory
effects with respect to judicial elections, whereas a similarly
discriminatory system already in place could not be challenged under MDRV
2.  It is unlikely that Congress intended such an anomalous result.

VI
    Finally, both respondents and the LULAC majority suggest that no
judicially manageable standards for deciding vote dilution claims can be
fashioned unless the standard is based on the one-person, one-vote
principle. {31}  They reason that because we have held the one-person,
one-vote rule inapplicable to judicial elections, see Wells v. Edwards, 409
U. S. 1095 (1973), aff'g 347 F. Supp., at 454, it follows that judicial
elections are entirely immune from vote dilution claims.  The conclusion,
however, does not follow from the premise.
    The holding in Wells rejected a constitutional challenge based on the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  It has no more
relevance to a correct interpretation of this statute than does our
decision in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980), which also rejected a
constitutional claim.  The statute was enacted to protect voting rights
that are not adequately protected by the Constitution itself.  Cf. City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 172-183 (1980).  The standard that
should be applied in litigation under MDRV 2 is not at issue here. {32}
Even if serious problems lie ahead in applying the "totality of
circumstances" described in MDRV 2(b), that task, difficult as it may prove
to be, cannot justify a judicially created limitation on the coverage of
the broadly worded statute, as enacted and amended by Congress.

VII
    Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 for the broad remedial
purpose of "rid[ding] the country of racial discrimination in voting."
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 315 (1966).  In Allen v. State
Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 567 (1969), we said that the Act should
be interpreted in a manner that provides "the broadest possible scope" in
combatting racial discrimination.  Congress amended the Act in 1982 in
order to relieve plaintiffs of the burden of proving discriminatory intent,
after a plurality of this Court had concluded that the original Act, like
the Fifteenth Amendment, contained such a requirement.  See Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980).  Thus, Congress made clear that a violation of
MDRV 2 could be established by proof of discriminatory results alone.  It
is difficult to believe that Congress, in an express effort to broaden the
protection afforded by the Voting Rights Act, withdrew, without comment, an
important category of elections from that protection.  Today we reject such
an anomalous view and hold that state judicial elections are included
within the ambit of MDRV 2 as amended.
    The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.







------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1
    Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 42 U. S. C. MDRV 1973 et seq. (1964 ed.,
Supp.  I).

2
    Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, now reads:
    "Sec. 2. (a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State
or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth
in section 4(f)(2), as provided in subsection (b).
    "(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading
to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not
equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected
by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice.  The extent to which members of a
protected class have been elected to office in the State or political
subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That
nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected
class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population."  96
Stat. 134.

3
    La. Const., Art. 5, MDRV 3; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. MDRV 13:101 (West
1983).

4
    La. Const., Art. 5, MDRV 22(A); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. MDRV 13:101 (West
1983).

5
    La. Const., Art. 5, MDRV 3.

6
    La. Const., Art. 5, MDRV 4; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. MDRV 13:101 (West
1983).

7
    "Section 14(c)(1), which defines `voting' and `vote' for purposes of
the Act, sets forth the types of election practices and elections which are
encompassed within the regulatory sphere of the Act.  Section 14(c)(1)
states,


"The terms `vote' or `voting' shall include all action necessary to make a
vote effective in any primary, special, or general election, including, but
not limited to, registration, listing pursuant to this subchapter or other
action required by law prerequisite to voting, casting a ballot, and having
such ballot counted properly and included in the appropriate totals of
votes cast with respect to candidates for public or party office and
propositions for which votes are received in an election.


"Clearly, judges are `candidates for public or party office' elected in a
primary, special, or general election; therefore, section 2, by its express
terms, extends to state judicial elections.  This truly is the only
construction consistent with the plain language of the Act."  Chisom v.
Edwards, 839 F. 2d, at 1059-1060.

8
    "It is difficult, if not impossible, for this Court to conceive of
Congress, in an express attempt to expand the coverage of the Voting Rights
Act, to have in fact amended the Act in a manner affording minorities less
protection from racial discrimination than that provided by the
Constitution. . . .  [S]ection 2 necessarily embraces judicial elections
within its scope.  Any other construction of section 2 would be wholly
inconsistent with the plain language of the Act and the express purpose
which Congress sought to attain in amending section 2; that is, to expand
the protection of the Act."  Id., at 1061.

9
    After remand, but before trial, plaintiffs (here petitioners) moved for
a preliminary injunction, enjoining the October 1, 1988 election for one of
the two Louisiana Supreme Court seats from the First Supreme Court
District.  The District Court granted plaintiffs' motion, having found that
they satisfied the four elements required for injunctive relief.  Chisom v.
Edwards, 690 F. Supp. 1524, 1531 (ED La. 1988).  The Court of Appeals,
however, vacated the preliminary injunction and ordered that the election
proceed as scheduled.  Chisom v. Roemer, 853 F. 2d 1186, 1192 (CA5 1988).
It reasoned that if the election were enjoined, the resulting uncertainty
would have a deleterious effect on the Louisiana Supreme Court and the
administration of justice that would outweigh any potential harm plaintiffs
might suffer if the election went forward.  Id., at 1190-1192.

10
    Petitioners did not seek review in this Court of the disposition of
their constitutional claims.  Brief for Petitioners 8, n. 2; Brief for
United States 4, n. 2; Tr. of Oral Arg. 27.

11
    409 U. S. 1095 (1973), aff'g 347 F. Supp. 453 (MD La. 1972) (whether
election of State Supreme Court Justices by district violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).

12
    412 U. S. 755 (1973) (whether population differential among districts
established a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).

13
    446 U. S. 55 (1980) (whether at-large system of municipal elections
violated black voters' rights under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments).

14
    See Brief for Respondents 16; Tr. of Oral Arg. 42.

15
    In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), the Court held that a
Local Act redefining the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee, Alabama,
violated the Fifteenth Amendment.  In his opinion for the Court, Justice
Frankfurter wrote:

"The opposite conclusion, urged upon us by respondents, would sanction the
achievement by a State of any impairment of voting rights whatever so long
as it was cloaked in the garb of the realignment of political
subdivisions."  Id., at 345.

"A statute which is alleged to have worked unconstitutional deprivations of
petitioners' rights is not immune to attack simply because the mechanism
employed by the legislature is a redefinition of municipal boundaries.
According to the allegations here made, the Alabama Legislature has not
merely redrawn the Tuskegee city limits with incidental inconvenience to
the petitioners; it is more accurate to say that it has deprived the
petitioners of the municipal franchise and consequent rights and to that
end it has incidentally changed the city's boundaries.  While in form this
is merely an act redefining metes and bounds, if the allegations are
established, the inescapable human effect of this essay in geometry and
geography is to despoil colored citizens, and only colored citizens, of
their theretofore enjoyed voting rights."  Id., at 347.

16
    Hearings on H. R. 6400 and Other Proposals To Enforce the 15th
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States before Subcommittee No.
5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 21
(1965).

17
    Pub. L. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400.

18
    The 1975 amendment added a new subsection to MDRV 4 of the Act.  The
new subsection reads in part as follows:
    "(f)(1) The Congress finds that voting discrimination against citizens
of language minorities is pervasive and national in scope.  Such minority
citizens are from environments in which the dominant language is other than
English. . . .
    "(2) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote because he is a member of a language minority group."
89 Stat. 401.

19
    H. R. 3112, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (emphasis added).

20
    "The objectives of S. 1992, as amended, are as follows: (1) to extend
the present coverage of the special provisions of the Voting Rights Act,
Sections 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8; (2) to amend Section 4(a) of the Act to permit
individual jurisdictions to meet a new, broadened standard for termination
of coverage by those special provisions; (3) to amend the language of
Section 2 in order to clearly establish the standards intended by Congress
for proving a violation of that section; (4) to extend the
language-assistance provisions of the Act until 1992; and (5) to add a new
section pertaining to voting assistance for voters who are blind, disabled,
or illiterate.

    . . . . .


    "S. 1992 amends Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to prohibit
any voting practice, or procedure [that] results in discrimination.  This
amendment is designed to make clear that proof of discriminatory intent is
not required to establish a violation of Section 2.  It thereby restores
the legal standards, based on the controlling Supreme Court precedents,
which applied in voting discrimination claims prior to the litigation
involved in Mobile v. Bolden.  The amendment also adds a new subsection to
Section 2 which delineates the legal standards under the results test by
codifying the leading pre-Bolden vote dilution case, White v. Regester.
    "This new subsection provides that the issue to be decided under the
results test is whether the political processes are equally open to
minority voters.  The new subsection also states that the section does not
establish a right to proportional representation."  S. Rep. No. 97-417, p.
2 (1982) (footnotes omitted).

21
    "The amendment to the language of Section 2 is designed to make clear
that plaintiffs need not prove a discriminatory purpose in the adoption or
maintenance of the challenged system of practice in order to establish a
violation.  Plaintiffs must either prove such intent, or, alternatively,
must show that the challenged system or practice, in the context of all the
circumstances in the juridiction in question, results in minorities being
denied equal access to the political process.
    "The `results' standard is meant to restore the pre-Mobile legal
standard which governed cases challenging election systems or practices as
an illegal dilution of the minority vote."  Id., at 27 (footnote omitted).

See also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 83-84 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment) ("Amended MDRV 2 is intended to codify the
`results' test employed in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971), and
White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), and to reject the `intent' test
propounded in the plurality opinion in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55
(1980))."

22
    The phrase is borrowed from Justice White's opinion for the Court in
White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), which predates Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U. S. 55 (1980).  Congress explained that its purpose in adding
subsection 2(b) was to "embod[y] the test laid down by the Supreme Court in
White."  S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 27.  In White, the Court said that the
"plaintiffs' burden is to produce evidence . . . that [the minority
group's] members had less opportunity than did other residents in the
district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators
of their choice."  412 U. S., at 766.

23
    Congress' silence in this regard can be likened to the dog that did not
bark.  See A. Doyle, Silver Blaze, in The Complete Sherlock Holmes 335
(1927).  Cf. Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 602 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("In a case where the construction of
legislative language such as this makes so sweeping and so relatively
unorthodox a change as that made here, I think judges as well as detectives
may take into consideration the fact that a watchdog did not bark in the
night").  See also American Hospital Assn. v. NLRB, --- U. S. --- (1991)
(slip op., at 6-7).

24
    The dissent argues that our literal reading of the word "and" leads to
the conclusion that a small minority has no protection against
infringements of its right "to participate in the political process"
because it will always lack the numbers necessary "to elect its candidate,"
post, at 6.  This argument, however, rests on the erroneous assumption that
a small group of voters can never influence the outcome of an election.

25
    See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 565 (1964) ("Full and
effective participation by all citizens in state government requires,
therefore, that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the
election of members of his state legislature").

26
    The word "representatives" rather than "legislators" was included in
Senator Robert Dole's compromise, which was designed to assuage the fears
of those Senators who viewed the House's version, H. R. 3112, as an
invitation for proportional representation and electoral quotas.  Senator
Dole explained that the compromise was intended both to embody the belief
"that a voting practice or procedure which is discriminatory in result
should not be allowed to stand, regardless of whether there exists a
discriminatory purpose or intent" and to "delineat[e] what legal standard
should apply under the results test and clarif[y] that it is not a mandate
for proportional representation."  Hearings on S. 53 et al. before the
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., 2d Sess., 60 (1982).  Thus, the compromise was not intended to
exclude any elections from the coverage of subsection (a), but simply to
make clear that the results test does not require the proportional election
of minority candidates in any election.

27
    Moreover, this Court has recently recognized that judges do engage in
policymaking at some level.  See Gregory v. Ashcroft, --- U. S. ---, ---
(1991) (slip op., at ---) ("It may be sufficient that the appointee is in a
position requiring the exercise of discretion concerning issues of public
importance.  This certainly describes the bench, regardless of whether
judges might be considered policymakers in the same sense as the executive
or legislature").  A judge brings to his or her job of interpreting texts
"a well-considered judgment of what is best for the community."  Id., at
--- (slip op., at ---).  As the concurrence notes, Justice Holmes and
Justice Cardozo each wrote eloquently about the "policymaking nature of the
judicial function."  Id., at --- (slip op., at ---) (White, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in judgment).

28
    See generally Winters, Selection of Judges -- An Historical
Introduction, 44 Texas L. Rev. 1081, 1082-1083 (1966).

29
    "Financing a campaign, soliciting votes, and attempting to establish
charisma or name identification are, at the very least, unseemly for
judicial candidates" because "it is the business of judges to be
indifferent to popularity."  Stevens, The Office of an Office, Chicago Bar
Rec. 276, 280, 281 (1974).

30
    Louisiana State Law Institute, Projet of a Constitution for the State
of Louisiana with Notes and Studies 1039 (1954) (1921 Report of the
Louisiana Bar Association submitted to the Louisiana Constitutional
Convention).  The editors of the project explained that they included the
1921 Report because "on the major issues involved in revising the judicial
provisions of the present constitution, it offers many proposals, that even
after the passage of thirty years, still merit serious consideration.  Of
particular interest are the procedures for the selection, retirement and
removal of judges. . . ."  Id., at 1035.

31
    The "one-person, one-vote" principle was first set forth in Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U. S. 368, 379, 381 (1963):

"Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is
designated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote
-- whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever their occupation,
whatever their income, and wherever their home may be in that geographical
unit.  This is required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

    . . . . .


"The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence,
to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and
Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing -- one person, one vote."

Since then, the rule has been interpreted to mean that "each person's vote
counts as much, insofar as it is practicable, as any other person's."
Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U. S. 50, 54 (1970).

32
    We note, however, that an analysis of a proper statutory standard under
MDRV 2 need not rely on the one-person, one-vote constitutional rule.  See
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S., at 88-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
judgment); see also White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973) (holding that
multimember districts were invalid, notwithstanding compliance with
oneperson, one-vote rule).  Moreover, Clark v. Roemer, 500 U. S. ---
(1991), the case in which we held that MDRV 5 applies to judicial
elections, was a vote dilution case.  The reasoning in the dissent, see
post, at 11-13, if valid, would have led to a different result in that
case.